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Abstract
By explicitly modeling  a distortion in the intermediate  goods  sector,  1 develop  a model of an
endogenous  vertical  multinational enterprise.  Firms  invest abroad to  lower  cost of  multi-stage
production. The  implications for  international trade  and  investment differ  markedly  from  the
conventional  wisdom of multinationals. Particularly, intra-fIrm trade in intermediates  implies vertical
investment  complements  rather than substitutes  for  trade. The decision to  become a  multinational
depends  on the level of foreign factor prices, nature of competition  with foreign suppliers, transport,
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Abstract
By  explicitly  modeling  a distortion  in the intermediate goods sector,  I  develop a model  of an
endogenous vertical  multinational  enterprise.  Firms  invest  abroad  to  lower  cost  of  multi-stage
production.  The  implications  for  international  trade  and  investment  differ  markedly  from  the
conventional  wisdom  of  multinationals.  Particularly,  intra-firm  trade  in intermediates implies  vertical
investment  complements  rather  than  substitutes  for  trade.  The  decision  to  become  a  multinational
depends on the  level  of  foreign  factor prices,  nature of  competition  with  foreign  suppliers,  transport,





Multinational Enterprise,  Vertical Integration1.  Introduction
Over the past  decade  inward direct foreign investment  has grown within some  developing  and
Casual newly  industrialized economies, particularly  in  Southeast  Asia,  at  a  remarkable rate.
observation implies  that  direct  foreign  investment (DFI)  inflow  in  these countries tends to  be
dominated  by industries with multi-stage  production  (vertical industries)  in pursuit of low-cost labor.
As Wells (1993)  observes,  the output of these  cost-conscience  investors  is also frequently destined  for
global, rather  than local, markets. North-South  trade in goods  frequently  reflects differences  in factor
endowments  as characterized  by standard  Hecksher-Ohlin  models. Likewise,  we might expect  the
composition  of  North-South DFI  to reflect endowment  differences such that inward DFI  occurs in
1 sectors  that intensively  employ  the country's abundant  resources.
That some  multinational  enterprises  (MNEs) invest  abroad  to lower production costs  is perhaps
Yet the bulk of the new MNE  theory and policy analyses  focus on market access not surprising.
incentives  for  DFI  [Markusen  1995,  1984, Horstmann  and Markusen  1992,  1989, Konan  1996a, b,
Helpman 1984, Ethier and Horn 1990, and Ethier 1986]. The conventional  wisdom that emerges  is
summarized  by the "convergence  theory" of Markusen  and Venables  (1994).  Multinationals are more
likely to exist when tariff or transport  barriers are high, incomes  are high, and  countries' endowments,
technologies,  and factor prices are similar.
The multinational described  by this literature is generally horizontally integrated, producing
essentially  the same  line of goods in multiple geographical  locations. In horizontal MNEs the value of
intangible assets  is high relative to firm market  value, as  these  assets  are the source  of scale  economies
and  are difficult to trade at arm's length.  Intra-firm technology  transfers  result in local production  that
is a substitute  for arm  I  s length  trade in final goods.
1  Aside from industry  case  studies,  little empirical work exists  on this issue.2
We must  be quite cautious  about  extending  the results  of the convergence  theory too readily to
developing and newly industrialized economies.  While  the  approach  is  important,  its  application
resides  largely in investment  flows between  similar advanced  countries  where DFI is likely to represent
technology  transfers Indeed, horizontal multinational models ignore aspects  of global multinational
activity,  such as intra-firm trade in intermediate  goods, that are better understood in a North-South
In addition, the convergence  theory is unable to  explain neither the significant iIiflows of context.
direct  investment into  less developed economies nor  the  rise  in  this  investment as developing
economies  liberalize trade policy
Very few formal models have been forthcoming for  intra-firm trade in  intermediate  goods.
One exception is Caves (1982) who presents an informal  description of the multi-stage  MNE  in which
vertical  integration occurs to  internalize a distortion,  such as imperfections in  intermediate  goods
markets stemming from  contract,  information,  and transaction costs, With scale  economies  at the input
stage of production, the  model of Helpman (1985) considers the  location choice of  MNE  plant
production as a  function of  differential factor prices. The Helpman model treats the  ownership
decision to vertically  integrate as exogenous and vertical  arm's  length transactions are not considered
In models without DFI,  Spencer  and Jones  (1992) and Rodrik and Yoon (1989) model government
policy  when a domestic firm  attains an  input produced mpre cheaply abroad from  a  vertically
As both firms compete  in the final good market, the price set by a foreign integrated  foreign supplier.
supplier is above that set by a monopolist producing  only the input.
In this paper, I provide  an example of an incentive for  North-South multinational  activity  based
on intra-firm  intermediate goods trade. MNEs invest abroad  in various stages  of production  to lower
the cost of supplying  an input rather than to gain access  to foreign  consumer markets.3
The focus of this paper  is on the question  of why a firm becomes  a vertical MNE rather than
an importer or domestic  producer of an intermediate  good. Vertical DFI is treated as an endogenous
decision for intermediate  good sourcing. A  firm decides  whether to invest, either domestically or
internationally,  in the production  of an intermediate input  or to  buy from  a foreign  monopolist. Plant
investment,  location, and production decisions  are endogenous  for a two-stage  production process  in
which factors are used in different proportions. Several  of the model's predictions  differ dramatically
from those of the theory of horizontal MNEs. For example, while  an important precondition for
horizontal  investment,  firm-specific assets  do not playa role in the decision  to become  a vertical MNE.
Instead,  subsidiary-level  plant costs  may influence  the choice of firm configuration.  High transport
costs  provide a tariff-jumping incentive  for horizontal investment  but act  to discourage  foreign vertical-
integration  in favor of inefficient domestic  production. Thus, subsidiary  output  thus is a complement,
not a substitute,  to headquarter  production.
Less obvious is the relationship  between  international  factor price differences  and the decision
A necessary  condition for vertical DFI is some cost advantage  of to become  a vertical multinational.
I  simulate the relationship between  firm foreign production such as less-expensive  foreign wages.
configuration  and factor prices with  linear final  demand and two  forms  of vertical  competition.  Given
low foreign wages,  the ownership  decision  (MNE versus ARM) is sensitive  to both factor prices and
the nature of vertical  competition betWeen  upstream and downstream  firms. When the potential
multinational's demand  for the intermediate  good is a small share of total intermediate  demand,  the
Thus MNE  production emerges  when oligopolistic markup on intermediate  price is  independent.
foreign wages are moderately low (and markups are moderately high) while  arm's  length trade emerges
for  very low wages (and low markups).  Alternatively, when intermediate  demand  by the potential
multinational is a significant share of total demand  oligopolistic markups is  negatively correlated  to4
wages. Thus an MNE  arises with  very low  foreign wages while  arm's  length trade arises with
moderately  low wages
The paper proceeds  as follows. In  section  2,  a generalized  model is developed in  which
production  requires two  stages:  unskilled  labor-intensive  with  an intermediate good as an output and
skilled labor-intensive. With  imperfect competition at both stages of production, the  final  good
producer's choice of firm  configuration (domestic  integration, imports, or MNE) is endogenous. A
linear demand  example  is considered  in section  3.  In section  4, I conduct  a brief welfare analysis  of
trade policy with  endogenous  .vertical firm  configuration. r  conclude with  summary comments  in
section 5.
2. The Model
There are two countries,  home and foreign (denoted  by superscript  *).  Each  has a workforce
of  skilled  (S,  S*) and unskilled  (L,  L *) labor that receives payments (s,  s*) and (w,  w*),  respectively.
Home is relatively skilled-labor  and factor  prices differ between  countries. Labor is immobile between
countries but transboundary  equity ownership  is permitted through direct foreign investment  (DFI).
Our focus is on two vertically related  industries,  that of an intermediate  good (Z) and a final good (X).
Assume  an oligopolistic industry with n symmetric  firms produce  a homogenous  product, Z in
the foreign country. World inverse demand  for Z units, pz(Z), is assumed  to be twice differentiable
where market  supply is given by Z = £1i=1  Zi. Let the corresponding  market  demand  function be z(PJ.
Z is produced  with unskilled labor inputs at a constant  marginal cost (w or w*). Entry into Z
production, in either country, requires a fixed plant cost of G. Thus Z is naturally oligopolistic and
produced  with plant-level  economies  of scale. The profit function for the ith firm is given by5
7tzt  =  P,(Z)ZI  -W*ZI  -G
{I)
Let A, =  ilZ/Oli be a firm's  conjectural  derivative or belief about  the way market output responds  to
changes  in its OUtput.2  Solving for the first-order condition of (1) and by the assumption  of symmetric
Zfirms,  we obtain  the equilibrium price of Z,  ji  =p(Z)  as given by equation  2
~  . p(Z)  =  fl. w,  where fl. =  (1-  U/Ez)-l  >  1,
(j  =  A.  /  n,  Ez
Thus a Z firm's  marginal cost markup, .uz, is  negatively correlated with  the market elasticity of
demand, 8z,  and positively  correlated with the conjectural elasticity,  0". As generally  assumed,  &z  is a
decreasing  function ofZ  quantity  demand
A home-based  monopoly supplies a homogenous  product, X. World  inverse demand  for X
units,  Px(X), is  assumed  to  be twice  differentiable, with  no  income effects. Let  x(PJ
corresponding  demand  function. Each unit of fmal X demand  is produced from one unit of skilled
labor and one unit of an intermediate  good Z with Leontief technology  and constant  marginal cost.
Fixed costs, F, are sufficiently large so as to make  X naturally monopolistic  with increasing  returns  to
3 scale technology. As we will  see below, the cost function for  X depends  on the ownership and
location configuration of production, which is endogenous. For simplicity, we assume  home has an
absolute  cost  advantage  in skilled labor that is sufficient  to insure  X production  locates  at home.
Imperfect competition in  X  and Z  industries creates a  version of  the familiar  successive
monopoly  distortion. 4 The X monopolist  sets  a markup on arm's length  marginal cost (including the Z
2S0  }"=1 implies Cournot  conjectures.
3That  is, the market  size  is sufficiently small  to make  non-monopoly  production  of X unprofitable for all firms in a
post-entry  Nash  equilibrium.
4See  Perry (1989)  and Tirole (1989) for a review of this literature.
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markup) rather  than the lesser  true marginal  cost. An incentive exists  to internalize  this distortion by
vertically integrating  production.  This paper  considers  the distinct advantages  and costs of alternative
Z  plant  location and  ownership configurations within  the  X  industry  in  order to  examine the
characteristics  of an endogenous  vertical MNE.
The equilibrium X firm configuration  is determined  by a two-step  procedure. In step  one, the
length imports from  foreign  oligopolists  ("ARM"  regime);  imports from  a vertically  integrated foreign
subsidiary ("MNE"  regime);  and domestic supply from a vertically  integrated plant ("DOM"  regime).
In step  two, the X fIrm selects  the profit-maximizing  price of X.  The programming  problem is solved
backwards, beginning  with the optimal  pricing  decision for  each  configuration.
ARM Profit Maximization
Consider  a scenario  in which the X firm elects  to import Z at arm's length.  As is evident by
the wide body of literature on vertical distortions (Perry 1989), imperfect competition between  the
upstream  X and  downstream  Z firms could take a variety of forms. In general,  both X and Z firms set  a
price above  marginal cost creating  a double marginalization  that implies lower output then is industry-
profit maximizing.
In this case,  the X firm pays  a markup ,uz  over  Z's marginal  cost w* such  that pz =,uzw*.  With
a specific tariff on Z imports, 't"z,  the home  monopolist's  cost  function is given by
c~  = F +  [8 +  ~z  w* +  tzlX (3)
The flfffi  selects  price to maximize  profits given by7
nann  =  (px(X)  -S  -Jlzw.  -'tz}X  -F (4)
As a monopolist  supplier of X, the optimal price of X, Px,  is a markup ,ux  over marginal cost
where I-1x =  (1  -1/  Ex  )-1  ,  Ex =  -~  ~  .s  For simplicity,  I assume  the X firm  does not avail
itself  of  any monopsony  power in the Z  market. Differentiating and solving for  the first  order
conditions  of the home  firm's programming  problem  yields
P..  =  J1..(S  +  J1z  w*  +  'tz)
(5)
Thus the home firm adds  a successive  markup over its marginal cost, which does not reflect
the true marginal cost of Z but rather  pz=.uzw", The ARM regime is always Pareto inefficient as the
consumer  price is higher and aggregate  producer  surplus is lower relative to a cooperative solution
where  joint X-Z industry profits are maximized. It should  be noted  that there is an incentive for X and
Z  firms  to  cooperate through more  complex contractual arrangements,  such as a  joint  venture
6
agreement. As  our focus is  on a firm's  decision to  become an MNE,  we save an analysis of
alternative  forms of DFI for future research.
Pareto inefficiency of arm  t  s length  purchase  of Z provides an incentive  to vertically integrate
the production process. The firm's  administration  makes  joint  profit  maximization decisions  across
vertically integrated  plants, thus avoiding the problem of double-marginalization. In this model, the
home  firm has  two options  for location  of an integrated  Z plant:  MNE production  through a foreign Z
subsidiary  and DOM production  with a domestic  Z plant.
5Note  llx is not a constant  but rather  a function of X output.
6See  Ethier (1986) for a discussion  of the role of contractual  arrangements  in direct foreign investment.8
MNE Profit Maximization
A home-based  MNE has  two main  advantages:  access  to low-cost  foreign labor inputs and the
ability to set  jointly  profit maximizing  prices.  The creation  of a foreign subsidiary, however, imposes
added  costs  on the flfIn. A  foreign  subsidiary faces costs beyond those of  independent local producers
such as language  translators, local  network development, and host government discrimination.
Although  a vertical  distortion  and differential  international  factor prices are necessary, these conditions
are insufficient  to assure equilibrium  vertical  DFI  when offsetting  costs are present.
Transaction  costs  of DFI may be either variable, t*, or fixed, T* or both.  Imports of Z also
incur a home tariff of 1";..  With subsidiary  plant start-up  cost of Z production, G, as well as firm-level
fixed cost of X production, F, the global cost function for MNE production  is given by
c,:ne =  F  +  G +  T*  +  [s +  w*  +  t*  +  'tzlx
(6)
Implying the MNE profit function
n;ne  =  [px(X)  -s  -w'
-'tz]X  -F  -G  -T* (7)
-t
7 and  corresponding  first-order condition of optimization.
Ji:me =  ~x {s +  w*  +  t*  +  'tzl
(8)
DOM Profit Maximization
A second  form of vertical integration  is domestic  where commonly  owned X and Z plants  are
located  at home. The DaM  firm is able  to set  a jointly profit maximizing  price and avoid transactions
and tariff  costs  of extending equity ownership  abroad This firm configuration, however, entails a
7  The home  unskilled wage, w, differs from foreign  wage  w'  by some  margin. If  w=w.+t*  +1"z then
~mne  ~dom Px  = Px  .9
w The cost function for the DOM regime  is given by
=  F  +  G  +  [s  +  w  j.x"
(9)
Implying the DaM  profit function
n;"'"  =  [Px(x)  -s  -wJX  -F  -G
(10)
Solving the programming  problem  yields the equilibrium price
(11)
Market Structure  Solution
In stage  one of the programming  problem, the X firm selelcts  the optimal method of supplying
intermediate  demand.  This decision  is made  by comparing  profit levels attainable  under alternative  Z
plant location  and ownership  configurations,  equations  4, 7, and 1(]1.
(12) n~  =  (JJ.x -1)(s  +  JJ.zW"  +  't"z)x(i';om)  -F
n;ne  =  (JJ.x -1)(s  +  w"  +  t"  +  'tz)x(ji;me)  -F  -G  -T"
n~om =  (JJ.x -1)(s  +  w)x(ji;om)  -F  -G
-- [ -ami  ~mne  -dam  7
Xx  -max  7tx  ,7tx  ,  7tx  j
The equilibrium firm  configuration may shift  in respons,e  to  marginal changes in  relevant
parameters. Our ability to do comparative  static analysis  is con~;trained  by the discontinuity of the
equilibrium  profit  function, 'it x All else  equal, marginal  changes  in a parameter  may imply a shift of
firm  configuration rather than a  marginal price,  output or  profit  response Nonetheless,  some
important conclusions may be  reach concerning the firm's  deciision  to  vertically  integrate, either10
domestically  or internationally, or to import Z at arm's length  as the graphical illustration of figure 1
demonstrates.
Certain parameters  influence equilibrium firm  configuration similarly  in  either a vertical or
horizontal distortion. One factor believed to  discourage horizontal MNEs  is  the  existence of
discriminatory costs associated  with  DFI  (Caves 1982, Markusen 1995), Figure one depicts the
relationship  between equilibrium  profits  in alternative vertical regimes and respective transaction costs
A.  A. costs  below the critical levels  (T  ,t A.  A.
Transaction  costs  above T  and t  are associated  with non-DFI
market  structures.
It is also believed that horizontal MNEs arise when subsidiary  fixed costs is relatively low,
Horstmann  and Markusen  (1992) We observe  a comparable  result in a vertical industry context. The
only firm  configuration under which Z plant-level fixed cost G is avoided is one of arm's length Z
import from an independent  supplier. A precondition  for vertical DFI is that G is relatively low, as  we
will demonstrate  in the following section.
In contrast, consider  the firm-specific fixed cost  F.  In horizontal MNE models, F serves  as a
globally-joint input across  subsidiary  plants.  In the presence  of scale  economies  horizontal MNEs are
more likely to exist in equilibrium when these firm-level inputs are relatively high.  Such  reasoning
does not extend to  vertical  DFI  as the  equilibrium choice of  vertical  subsidiary ownership is
independent  of F that cannot  be avoided  by alternative  regime  choice.
8 The slope ore/~=-l,  whilen
~z
Figure 1:  Comparative Statics12
Case  One: Independent  Z-markup
In case  one, the Z market is significantly larger than X-industry input demand. Hence the Z
markup  J.Lz  is independent from X firm's  decisions and pz =  ~z  w'
A primary reason  for locating Z production processes  abroad is the availability of low cost
unskilled labor.  Figure 2 shows  the equilibrium firm configuration  for various sets  of unskilled wage
.
coordinates  (w, w)  holding other  parameters  fixed.  The depicted  loci give the set of coordinates  for
which the home firm  is  indifferent between  two  firm  configurations. For example, the X  firm  is
indifferent betWeen  ARM and MNE configurations  when  profits are equal  under  the alternative  regimes
or equivalently
~ann  ~mne  1  r.  * J2  1  r.  * 7tx  -7tx  =  ""ila  -s  -J.lzw  -'tz  -""ila  -s  -w  -t 2 -'tzJ  +  G  +  T*  =  0
Because  the expression  is  independent  of home wages  w, the boundary between  ARM  and
MNE regimes  is a horizontal  line.  Above this threshold  w., the transaction  cost of becoming  an MNE
is less  than the cost of double marginalization  under  the ARM regime. With a constant  Z markup, as
the differential between  home  and foreign wages  increases  foreign oligopolists  have  an enhanced  ability
to  mark prices above marginal cost. High Z profit  margins (associated  with  high w*) provide an
incentive  for MNE investment  in a foreign Z subsidiary
Consider  the boundary between  DOM and MNE regimes. To the left of this locus, foreign
wages  are not low enough  to compensate  for the transportation  costs  and differential transaction  costs
that would be incurred by an MNE. As foreign wages  fall or, equivalently,  home  wages  rise an MNE
equilibrium is more likely to occur. This result corresponds  to that of Helpman's (1985) model of
vertically integrated  MNE plant location.foreign  wage
home  wage
Figure  2:  Case  One,  Firm Configuration  and  Unskilled  Labor
Z fixed plant  cost
~  mne  ~  dom
7t  =7t
tariff
Figure  3:  Firm Configuration  and  Trade  Policy13
Likewise, the boundary  between  DaM  and  ARM regimes  has  positive slope and curvature. In
this case,  the benefits  from wage  differentials must sufficiently outweigh  the cost of foreign oligopoly
pricing and transportation  before  the ARM regime  is selected  as  an equilibrium market  structure.
This finding  is  in direct contrast  to the "convergence  hypothesis" of Markusen (1995) that
international  commerce  between  countries  of similar size  and  relative factor endowments  is more likely
to be dominated  by multinationals.  In this view horizontal  MNEs arise endogenously  when they are
able to transfer firm-specific increasing  returns  to scale  technology  abroad at low cost. The impetus
for vertical DFI is markedly different as  the benefits  are production  cost rather  than consumer  demand
driven. Thus  given significant oligopoly markups, the  greater the  disparity  in  wages between
countries,  the more likely international  economic  activity will be dominated  by vertical multinationals
Consider the  impact of  the  Z  plant-level fiXed cost G  and the  specific Z  tariff, 'fl'  on
I derive loci of indifference between  firm  configurations in ('fz, G) equilibrium firm  configuration
parameter  space  in figure 3 Recall the X firm  avoids G  only  by  importing  Z  at arm I  s length. The
ARM equilibrium dominates  both MNE and DaM  for sufficiently high Go As in a horizontal MNE
model, vertical  MNEs  are more likely  to arise in industries with  low  subsidiary plant-level  costs.
Once again, I find  an area of distinction  between horizontal  and vertical  MNEs.  Production by
a horizontal  MNE  is import-competing  and thus a substitute for  international trade.  Horizontal  MNEs
tend to  arise when transportation and tariff  barriers are relatively high.9 This  "tariff-jumping"
argument  does not apply to  a vertical MNE whose subsidiary production and intra-firm  export of
In this case,  the X firm spares  the specific intermediate goods is a complement to international  trade
9See  Markusen  (1995) for a review of these  horizontal  MNE models.14
low G and high .z while an MNE equilibrium implies relatively low G and low .z.
Case]Wo: Dependent  Z-markup
In the second  linear demand  example,  Z is a specialized  component  used only as an X input.
Without loss in generality, I  maintain the assumption  that the X firm  does not exploit monopsony
buying power in the Z market. Taking  pz as given in arm's length  Z purchases,  X demand  and  hence  Z
demand  is derived from the equilibrium profit function n~mIof the system  of equations  (13) and given
by  X  = Z  = t(a  -p  z -s  -'t  z)  and corresponding inverse Z demand pz  =  a  -s  -Tz  -2Z. Assume
Cournot-Nash  competition between  Z firms  or A = 1 Profit maximization  of  equation  1 implies  a
firm-level Cournot-Nash  equilibrium inverse  demand  given by
P.  = (l+;)-l(a-s-'t.  +w*)
Substituting  pz  into Px  and solving for subgaDle  equilibrium X profits of system  (13), I obtain
~ann  1(1 ) -2 ( *)2 F 7tx  =4  +n  a-s-'t,-nw  -
The key difference between  linear demand  examples  one (independent  Z markup) and two is
the equilibrium firm configuration over unskilled wage space,  figure 4. As in example  one,  the firm
will  not source Z from abroad  unless foreign wages are significantly lower than domestic  wages  to
compensate  for additional costs such  as transportation. The DOM regime thus includes  the 450 line
where  w=w' The difference  due  to endogenous  Z markups  is in the relationship  between  equilibrium
firm configuration  and  unskilled wages  in the ARM and MNE regimes In the arm's length  regime of
case  one, foreign wages  are marked  up by a constant regardless  of X demand. The MNE equilibriumforeign  wage
home  wage
Figure 4: Case  Two, Firm Configuration  and  Unskilled Labor15
thus dominates  for wages  above  the threshold na;" = n:;me  as the arm's length markup  becomes  more
burdensome.
4. Trade  Policy, Welfare, and Equilibrium Market Structure
In this  section I  analyze  the effect of  tariff  policy  in vertically related markets when firm
configuration  is endogenous.Consider  the partial equilibrium home  social surplus derived from the X
and Z industries.  National surplus, W, may  be represented  as the sum of consumer  surplus vCr),  tariff
10 revenue Z-r  E'  and equilibrium  profits,  7t  %  .
W  =  v(t) +  Z  't:  +  1t%




shown in section  3, the equilibrium X firm configuration  is sensitive  to the tariff rate.
small change in  the  tariff  rate  may result  in  a  shift  in  input  sourcing decisions, implying  a
corresponding jump  in  price,  Z  imports,  and profits. Welfare  is  thus  discontinuous
Additionally,  as it  attempts  to  avoid taxation the X  firm  does not necessarily select the welfare
maximizing  firm configuration,
The relationship  between  MNE source  country  welfare and Tz  is demonstrated  with our linear
demand  example in figures 5 and 6.  For simplicity, assume  Z plant costs  are relatively high and an
lOConsumer  surplus  is employed  as  a welfare  measure  because  there  are no income  effects.  If we assume  that tariff
announcements  are made  prior to the firm's decision, then start-up  costs  F and G are fixed rather than sunk.  In
this case,  producer  profits are  an accurate  measure  of producer  surplus  with constant  marginal cost  technology.16
MNE exists in the absence  of a tariff.  Z is only imported for use in X production  and home  consumes
a constant  share of world  X output.  In each  case,  bold curves give the (discontinuous)  equilibrium
welfare and profit functions  while thin curves  hold relevant  finn configuration  constant.
Case One
Figure 5 depicts  equilibrium profits and welfare as a function of tariffs in the initial example
where  arm's length exports  of Z are marked  up by a constant,  .uz. I assume  initial parameters  whereby
zero tariff  and MNE  production are socially and privately optimal, As the tariff  increases,  both
consumer  surplus and profits decline as the firm's  marginal cost and Px increase. With  MNE
ownership  there is no possibility of improving terms of trade for Z imports.  At the critical tariff rate,
the X firm switches  between  MNE and ARM configurations. This implies a jump in welfare as profits
are shifted abroad. For tariff rates  beyond  'tz2,  Z will  not be imported in equilibrium.  A second  jump
in welfare may  result as Z production  inefficiently shifts to the home  country.
Case ThIo
Our second  illustration, figure 6, depicts  equilibrium profits and social  welfare as a function of
tariff  policy when using Z only in production of X.  Assuming  no retaliation, the home government
may exploit monopsony  power over arm's length  imports  through  tariff policy
Say  the initial tariff rate  implies the ARM regime will dominate  or t'zE (t'/,  t';). A nation that
maximizes  welfare assuming  the X firm  configuration is  invariant to  tariff  policy would  select  the
Yet, 'rz' is locally-optimal rather than globally-optimal The welfare maximizing optimal tariff,  'Cz'.
policy is one that eliminates  the tariff, thus providing the impetus  for outward investment  in Z.17
5. Summary  and Concluding  Remarks
By explicitly including  the possibility of a distortion in the intermediate  goods  sector, I develop
a model of an endogenous  multinational  enterprise  that explains  North-South  direct foreign investment.
The implications  for international  trade and investment  differ markedly from the conventional  wisdom
of MNEs as set forth in the convergence  theory, Markusen  and Venables  1994. Foreign investment
complements,  rather  than substitutes  for,  international  trade while investment  is more likely to emerge
between  countries  of dissimilar endowments.
A  firm  has one  of  three configurations: domestic  vertical integration; MNE  vertical
integration; or arm's  length import of  intermediate  inputs at a marked up price The home  firm
compares  potential profitability under the range of plant location and ownership  options for the low-
skilled labor intensive intermediate  good. The emergence  of a vertical MNE was discussed  in the
context of basic parameters. Marginal changes  in parameter  specifications  may lead to discontinuities
in equilibrium price, profits, and welfare as the firm switches  investment  and production strategies.
MNE activity is negatively  correlated  with oligopoly markups on inputs, DFI transactions  costs, and
intermediate  plant-level  fixed costs.
Less obvious is the relationships  between  firm configuration  and international  unskilled wage
differentials. Two  assumptions  about bilateral competition between intermediate and final  good
demand  were considered. In the first  case the final good comprises a small fraction of  market
intermediate demand,  implying  an  independent intermediate markup. As a result, harmonization  in
In  contrast to the convergence international unskilled wages implies domestic  vertical integration.
theory of horizontal MNEs, significant factor price dispersion  results in vertical MNE production for
moderately  low foreign wages and arm's length intermediate  imports for  very low foreign wages.18
Counter to  the  tariff-jumping  argument for  horizontal DFI,  I  find  that  low  tariff  rates are a
precondition  for an MNE  equilibrium.
In the second  case,  I assume  the intermediate  good is a specialized  component  used only as an
input for a monopolistic final good The findings are similar to those of case  one with one important
exception. As foreign wages  rise, oligopolist intermediate  goods producers lower their equilibrium
markup rates to  preserve market demand. Thus arm's  length exports of  the  intermediate good
dominate when foreign unskilled  wages are moderately low and a vertical  MNE  emerges for  very  low
wages. Finally,  marginal changes  in trade policy are shown to have large welfare implications as
equilibrium  firm  configuration  shifts19
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